

War Support Monitor

How public support for military aid, sanctions, negotiations and troop deployment is changing in Europe, the UK, the US, Ukraine and Russia, built from published polls with the date and source of every figure.

Figures last reviewed: 24 October 2026 · <https://www.thecostofwar.net/en/war-support>

Figures come from published polls and are updated when new waves appear. Questions differ between pollsters, so compare values within the same series.

Main findings

1. Majorities in most EU countries tracked still back financing weapons for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, but support is edging down: 57% EU-wide in autumn 2025 and 56% in spring 2026 for military equipment. Italy is split and Hungary is the clear exception.
2. Sanctions are the most widely supported measure: from 49% (Hungary) to 86% (Poland) in the EU countries tracked here, and 69% in the United States, including 70% of Republicans.
3. Sending troops is a minority position almost everywhere: 26–37% in the EU countries tracked here (ECFR, May 2026) and 31% in the U.S. Of the countries tracked, only Britain reaches half (51%).
4. Ukrainians are war-weary but unwilling to concede: 66% want a negotiated end as soon as possible, yet 61% call giving up Donbas for security guarantees categorically unacceptable. Strong guarantees, such as European troops near the front, nearly double acceptance of a ceasefire.
5. Most Russians favour peace talks (59–67% in every 2026 survey) while about 70% still say they support the army's actions. Young people lean most towards talks, and ending the war by returning annexed territory remains unpopular.
6. In the United States, party is the deciding factor: 71% of Democrats but 48% of Republicans favour military aid, and Republican opinion has moved with the administration's position.

How support is measured

■ Military aid

Support for supplying or financing weapons and military aid to Ukraine. Wordings differ: EU respondents are asked whether they agree with the EU financing military equipment; U.S. polls ask whether America is doing 'too much' or 'not enough', or whether people favour military aid.

■ Sanctions on Russia

Support for imposing, keeping or tightening economic sanctions on Russia's government, companies and individuals.

■ Negotiations

Preference for a negotiated end to the war. In Ukraine and Russia this is the main question pollsters track. A higher value means more people favour talks now; it does not by itself mean support for any particular terms.

■ Troop deployment

Support for sending national troops to Ukraine, usually as peacekeepers or a reassurance force after a ceasefire or peace deal. In Ukraine, the question is whether people would accept a ceasefire if European troops were stationed near the front.

Compare countries

Only questions asked the same way in every country are compared.


Military aid: agree with EU financing weapons (Eurobarometer, Oct–Nov 2025)



Sanctions on Russia (Eurobarometer, Oct–Nov 2025)



Troops after a peace deal (ECFR, May 2026)



Country profiles

Germany



Key drivers

- Support for financing weapons is steady at 63%, but a little over four in ten said in September 2026 that weapons support goes too far. Opposition outweighs support in eastern Germany and among AfD supporters.
- About a third (36%) would send German troops after a peace deal, and AfD voters mostly see Ukraine as a rival or adversary.
- Cost is contested: the Kiel Institute found that only about €41.7 billion of Germany's reported €100 billion in 'bilateral aid' actually reached Ukraine.

All figures and sources

63% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

63% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

75% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

76% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

36% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 13 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

France



Key drivers

- A slim majority backs financing weapons (53%) and a clear majority backs sanctions (71%), but only 40% say they want Ukraine to win and care that it does.
- 37% support sending French troops after a peace deal (ECFR, May 2026).

All figures and sources

53% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

54% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

71% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

70% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

37% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 5 – 15 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

Poland



Key drivers

- Poland pairs the strongest sanctions support in the tracked group (86%) and rising support for financing weapons (74%) with fatigue: in July 2026, 39% called Western aid sufficient, 27% too large and 22% too small.
- Party is the strongest dividing line: 48% of voters of the Confederation parties call aid too large, against 10% of governing-coalition voters.
- Only 26% support sending Polish troops after a peace deal, the lowest of the tracked countries in ECFR's May 2026 survey.

All figures and sources

74% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

70% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

86% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

83% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

32% — Prefer encouraging a negotiated end, even if Russia keeps conquered territory (YouGov) — Dec 2025 — [YouGov](#)

26% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 15 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

Italy



Key drivers

- Italy is evenly split on financing weapons (48% agree, 49% disagree) and leans towards diplomacy: 53% favour a negotiated end even if Russia keeps conquered territory.
- Sanctions still have majority backing (68%).

All figures and sources

48% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

49% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)


68% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

67% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

53% — Prefer encouraging a negotiated end, even if Russia keeps conquered territory (YouGov) — Dec 2025 — [YouGov](#)
30% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 14 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

Hungary

Péter Magyar's Tisza party won Hungary's 12 April 2026 election, ending Viktor Orbán's Fidesz government.




Key drivers

- Hungary has the lowest support for financing weapons among the countries tracked (41%) and is split on sanctions (49% agree, 47% disagree).
- The change of government has not changed views on aid: after the election only 12% backed Hungarian military aid to Ukraine, and even Tisza voters opposed it by a 57-point margin.

All figures and sources

41% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
40% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
12% — Support Hungary providing military aid to Ukraine (ECFR, April 2026) — 17 – 27 Apr 2026 — [ECFR poll \(Stratega Research, Mandate Research\), reported by The Kyiv Independent](#)
49% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
51% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
27% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 19 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

Estonia




Key drivers

- Support stays high but fell noticeably in autumn 2025: financing weapons down 5 points to 64%, sanctions down 5 points to 68%.
- 37% would send Estonian troops after a peace deal.

All figures and sources

64% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
69% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
68% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
73% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
37% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 8 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)

Latvia



Key drivers

- 67% back financing weapons (down 2 points) and 72% back sanctions (up 2 points).

All figures and sources

67% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

69% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

72% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

70% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

Lithuania



Key drivers

- Among the most supportive in the EU: 77% back financing weapons and 82% back sanctions.

All figures and sources


77% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

79% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

82% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

83% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

EU average



Key drivers

- Across the EU, 57% backed financing weapons in autumn 2025 and 56% in spring 2026; sanctions stayed between 70% and 73%.
- Economic strain matters more than age: 39% of people who struggle to pay bills most of the time back financing weapons, against 63% of those who almost never do. By age the range is only 56–61%.

All figures and sources

56% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — 12 Mar – 5 Apr 2026 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 105 \(via EU Neighbours East\)](#)

57% — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

59% (derived) — Agree: EU financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

70% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — 12 Mar – 5 Apr 2026 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 105 \(via EU Neighbours East\)](#)

73% — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Oct – Nov 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)
72% (derived) — Agree: economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals (Eurobarometer) — Mar – Apr 2025 — [European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104](#)

United Kingdom




Key drivers

- Britain is the most consistently pro-Ukraine large European country polled: 48% want the West to back Ukraine until it prevails, against 24% for a negotiated end.
- Most support British peacekeepers (56% in December 2025). ECFR's stricter question about sending troops after a peace deal found 51% in favour, the highest of the countries tracked here.
- Reform UK voters are the outlier: 47% want Ukraine to win, against 77–86% of Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters (February 2025).

All figures and sources

48% — West should support Ukraine until Russia withdraws / Ukraine prevails (YouGov) — Dec 2025 — [YouGov](#)
44% — West should support Ukraine until Russia withdraws / Ukraine prevails (YouGov) — 1 – 20 Feb 2025 — [YouGov](#)
24% — Prefer encouraging a negotiated end, even if Russia keeps conquered territory (YouGov) — Dec 2025 — [YouGov](#)
51% — Support sending national troops to Ukraine after a peace deal (ECFR) — 30 Apr – 7 May 2026 — [European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)
56% — Support British peacekeeping troops alongside other European countries (YouGov) — Dec 2025 — [YouGov](#)
58% — Support British peacekeeping troops alongside other European countries (YouGov) — 16 Jan 2025 — [YouGov](#)

United States



Key drivers


- Party is the main driver: 71% of Democrats but 48% of Republicans favour military aid. Republican views move with the administration: the share saying the U.S. does 'too much' fell from 67% to 40% between December 2024 and August 2025.
- Support is falling again: in October 2026, 46% of registered voters said the U.S. should send military aid, down from 56% in July. The drop came from Republicans (41% to 28%) and independents (57% to 44%); Democrats held at 69%.

- Sanctions unite Americans more than aid: 69% favour increasing sanctions on Russia, including 70% of Republicans.
- Few favour sending U.S. troops (31%); 66% oppose.

All figures and sources

46% — U.S. is not doing enough to help Ukraine (Gallup) — 1 – 15 Aug 2025 — [Gallup](#)
 46% (derived) — U.S. is not doing enough to help Ukraine (Gallup) — Mar 2025 — [Gallup](#)
 29% — U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine (Pew) — 23 – 29 Mar 2026 — [Pew Research Center](#)
 22% — U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine (Pew) — Feb 2025 — [Pew Research Center](#)
 46% — U.S. should send military aid to Ukraine (Economist/YouGov, registered voters) — 19 – 20 Oct 2026 — [YouGov / The Economist](#)
 56% — U.S. should send military aid to Ukraine (Economist/YouGov, registered voters) — Jul 2026 — [YouGov / The Economist](#)
 59% — Favor military aid to Ukraine (Chicago Council) — 10 – 21 Jul 2026 — [Chicago Council on Global Affairs \(Ipsos KnowledgePanel\)](#)
 69% — Favor increasing sanctions on Russia (Chicago Council) — 10 – 21 Jul 2026 — [Chicago Council on Global Affairs \(Ipsos KnowledgePanel\)](#)
 45% — End the war quickly, even if Ukraine gives up territory (Gallup) — 1 – 15 Aug 2025 — [Gallup](#)
 31% — Favor U.S. troops to help Ukraine defend itself (Chicago Council) — 10 – 21 Jul 2026 — [Chicago Council on Global Affairs \(Ipsos KnowledgePanel\)](#)

Ukraine




Key drivers

- Two-thirds want a negotiated end as soon as possible (66% in April 2026), but most reject giving up Donbas: 61% call it categorically unacceptable (October 2026).
- Security guarantees decide whether a ceasefire is acceptable: 32% would accept one with no guarantees, 61% if European troops were stationed near the front.
- Trust in Washington has collapsed: 7% approve of U.S. leadership (April 2026), down from 66% in 2022.

All figures and sources

66% — Ukraine should seek a negotiated end as soon as possible (Gallup) — Apr 2026 — [Gallup](#)
 69% — Ukraine should seek a negotiated end as soon as possible (Gallup) — 1 – 15 Jul 2025 — [Gallup](#)
 24% — Keep fighting until victory (Gallup) — Apr 2026 — [Gallup](#)
 24% — Keep fighting until victory (Gallup) — 1 – 15 Jul 2025 — [Gallup](#)
 35% — Could accept withdrawing from Donbas in exchange for US-European security guarantees (KIIS) — 8 – 16 Oct 2026 — [Kyiv International Institute of Sociology \(KIIS\)](#)
 39% — Could accept withdrawing from Donbas in exchange for US-European security guarantees (KIIS) — 9 – 14 Jan 2026 — [Kyiv International Institute of Sociology \(KIIS\)](#)
 61% — Would accept a ceasefire on the current line with European troops near the front (KIIS) — 7 May – 3 Jun 2026 — [Kyiv International Institute of Sociology \(KIIS\)](#)

Russia



Key drivers

- Most Russians favour talks (59–67% throughout 2026), while about 70% still say they support the army's actions. Wanting the war to end is not the same as opposing it.
- Age is the clearest divide: 77% of under-24s favour talks; support for the army is 80% among those 55 and older against 56% of under-24s.
- Terms matter: 81% would back Putin ending the war 'this week', but only 35% if it meant returning annexed territories (51% would not).

All figures and sources

64% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 23–30 Sept 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
59% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 18–28 Aug 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
62% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 21–28 Jul 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
64% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 23–30 Jun 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
60% (derived) — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 20–28 May 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
62% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 22–29 Apr 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
64% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 18–26 Mar 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
67% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 18–25 Feb 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
61% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 15–23 Jan 2026 — [Levada Center](#)
66% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 11–19 Dec 2025 — [Levada Center](#)
62% — Should move to peace negotiations now (Levada) — 23 Sept–1 Oct 2025 — [Levada Center](#)
27% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 23–30 Sept 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
31% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 18–28 Aug 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
28% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 21–28 Jul 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
29% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 23–30 Jun 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
30% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 20–28 May 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
27% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 22–29 Apr 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
24% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 18–26 Mar 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
24% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 18–25 Feb 2026 — [Левада-Центр](#)
31% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 15–23 Jan 2026 — [Levada Center](#)
25% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 11–19 Dec 2025 — [Levada Center](#)
29% — Should continue military action (Levada) — 23 Sept–1 Oct 2025 — [Levada Center](#)

Data limitations

- Questions differ between pollsters and countries, so values are comparable only within the same series (same pollster and wording). The comparison chart only uses questions asked identically across countries.
- Russia: polling takes place under wartime censorship and criminal penalties for 'discrediting the army'. Researchers disagree on how much fear and refusals distort answers; one study of 42 phone polls found no fall in participation, while critics point to unknown refusal rates and socially desirable answers. Treat levels with caution; trends within Levada's series are more informative.
- Ukraine: polls cover only government-controlled territory. They exclude people in occupied areas and refugees who left after February 2022, and wartime telephone surveys add bias that pollsters say they cannot quantify.
- Eurobarometer country figures for spring 2026 were not publicly available when this page was reviewed. Country trends therefore use spring and autumn 2025; spring 2025 values are derived from the change Eurobarometer prints beside the autumn figures and are marked as derived.
- Most figures have a margin of error of about ± 2 to ± 5 points, so small month-to-month changes may be noise. A few points are older than 12 months; they are kept to show the direction of travel and dated clearly.
- Social media and news sentiment is not measured here. The page cites published polls and analyses only, never individual users. The daily scan lists new publications from pollsters and think tanks; figures change only when new polls are published and reviewed.

Sources

European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 104: The EU's response to the war in Ukraine (Autumn 2025) — https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/standard-eurobarometer-104_autumn-2025_eus-response-to-the-war-in-ukraine_report_en.pdf
European Commission — Standard Eurobarometer 105 (via EU Neighbours East): New Eurobarometer shows continued strong support for EU's response to war in Ukraine — <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/new-eurobarometer-shows-continued-strong-support-for-eus-response-to-war-in-ukraine/>
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves — <https://ecfr.eu/publication/home-alone-europeans-are-ready-to-defend-themselves/>
ECFR poll (Stratega Research, Mandate Research), reported by The Kyiv Independent: Most Magyar voters against Hungary aiding Ukraine, split on Kyiv's EU bid, poll shows — <https://kyivindependent.com/most-of-magyars-voters-oppose-hungarian-aid-to-ukraine-split-on-kyivs-eu-bid-poll-shows/>

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CBOS: Komunikat z badań 80/2026: Polacy o międzynarodowej pomocy dla walczącej Ukrainy — https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2026/K_080_26.PDF

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Gallup: Americans widely pessimistic about Ukraine-Russia peace deal — <https://news.gallup.com/poll/694496/americans-widely-pessimistic-ukraine-russia-peace-deal.aspx>

YouGov / The Economist: Support for sending military aid to Ukraine has fallen — <https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55803-support-for-sending-military-aid-to-ukraine-has-fallen>

Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Ipsos KnowledgePanel): Most Americans favor increasing sanctions on Russia — <https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/most-americans-favor-increasing-sanctions-russia>

Gallup: Ukrainians sour on U.S. leadership as views of war stabilize — <https://news.gallup.com/poll/711992/ukrainians-sour-washington-views-war-stabilize.aspx>

Gallup: Ukrainian support for war effort collapses — <https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukrainian-support-war-effort-collapses.aspx>

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS): War and peace: opinions and views of Ukrainians (January 9-14, 2026) — <https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1579&lang=eng&page=1>

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS): Attitude towards the ceasefire along the current front line (May 7-June 3, 2026) — <https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1615&lang=eng&page=1>

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS): Opinions and views of Ukrainians on issues of war and peace (October 8-16, 2026) — <https://kiis.com.ua/?cat=reports&id=1643&lang=eng&page=1>

Levada Center: Ukraine conflict, September 2025 — <https://www.levada.ru/en/2025/10/22/ukraine-conflict-attention-support-attitudes-toward-negotiations-and-possible-scenarios-for-ending-the-conflict-in-september-2025/>

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